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ABSTRACT:
The standard of the patient’s best interests is the main bioethical standard used in the decision-making 
process that involves incompetent patients (i.e. neonatology, pediatric patients and incompetent adults). 
This standard has been widely criticized as being self-destructive, individualistic, vague, unknown, dan-
gerous and open to abuse. With the purpose of defending it, several reforms of this standard have been 
proposed, especially in the pediatric field. We propose a redefinition of the standard based on two con-
cepts: 1) medical futility as a negative criterion, and 2) the principle of proportionality as a positive crite-
rion. Our work includes a new relationship between concepts in classical moral theology (i.e. ordinary / 
extraordinary; proportionate / disproportionate) applied to the bioethics of life-sustaining treatments for 
incompetent patients.
RESUMEN:
El estándar del mejor interés del paciente es el único estándar bioético utilizado en los procesos de de-
cisión de tratamientos en enfermos no competentes (neonatología, pediatría y adultos no competentes). 
Este estándar ha sido ampliamente criticado por autodestructivo, individualista, vago, desconocido, peli-
groso y abierto a abusos. Para defender el estándar se han propuesto varias reformulaciones especialmente 
en el ámbito pediátrico. Nosotros proponemos una redefinición del estándar basada en dos conceptos: 1) 
el de futilidad médica como criterio negativo, y 2) el principio de proporcionalidad como criterio positivo. 
Nuestro trabajo incluye una nueva relación entre los conceptos de la teología moral clásica (ordinario / 
extraordinario; proporcionado / desproporcionado) aplicados a la bioética de los tratamientos de soporte 
vital en pacientes no competentes.
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1. Introduction
The inclusion of the concept of patient autonomy 
at the heart of medical ethics was the most striking 
innovation in bioethics field1. From this moment, the 
development of bioethics had as its nuclear objective to 
defend individual autonomy through the informed con-
sent of the patient to treatment2. The informed consent 
determined the bioethical frame of reflection for the 
bioethical principles, established for a bioethics of adults 
and competent patients3. At that time it was thought 
that this framework could be extended to children and 
other incompetent patients4.
The doctrine of informed consent requires three 
elements: 1) that the decision is free, 2) informed and 
3) that the person is competent5. The key concept of 
competence divided patients into competent individuals 
who can make autonomous decisions about a medical 
treatment, and incompetent individuals who can`t make 
decisions for themselves6.
Problems arise when patients are not competent: 
who should decide for them? Buchanan and Brock rai-
sed the need for a theory of surrogate decision making 
that could extend respect for the autonomy of the 
competent autonomous patient to the incompetent pa-
tient7. Beauchamp and Childress proposed the applica-
tion of certain standards that, from the judicial context, 
could be applied to the surrogated decision-making in 
the medical field8. The bioethics of principles pointed to 
four standards when making medical decisions9: 1) The 
1 Cfr. Jonsen, A.R., A short history of medical ethics, Oxford 
University Press, New York 2000.
2 Cfr. President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Prob-
lems in Medicine and Behavioral Research, Making health care 
decisions, Washington DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, 
17-35.
3 Cfr. Beauchamp, T.L., Childress, J.F., Principles of biomedical 
ethics, New York, Oxford University Press, 20086, 136.
4 Cfr. Buchanan, A.E., Brock, D.W., Deciding for others: The 
ethics of surrogate decision-making, New York, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1989, 113.
5 Cfr. President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Prob-
lems in Medicine and Behavioral Research, Making health care…, 
op. cit., 55.
6 Cfr. Buchanan, A.E., Brock, D.W., Deciding for others…, op. 
cit., 27.
7 Idem, 87.
8 Cfr. Beauchamp, T.L., Childress, J.F., Principles of biomedical 
ethics…, op. cit., 136.
9 Cfr. Kopelman, L.M., “Children: health care and research 
issues”, in Post, S.G. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics, New York, 
respect for the patient´s autonomy applies to the volun-
tary decisions of legally competent and informed adult 
subjects who make their own choices about their well-
being as long as it does not harm or violate the rights 
of others; 2) Advance directives or vital wills. Competent 
persons can draft advance directives on their treatments 
or verbally express what they would prefer in the case 
that they become incapacitated. This standard is also 
known as pure autonomy or precedent autonomy10; 3) 
The third standard is that of the substituted or surroga-
ted judgment standard, which applies to an incompe-
tent patient but who was once able to express preferen-
ces; the person making this substitute decision chooses 
the option that he/she believes the person would have 
chosen if he or she was able to do so; 4) The standard of 
the patient’s best interest is to identify the highest net 
benefit among the various options available. This stan-
dard applies to pediatric neonatal patients, unqualified 
minors, and incompetent adult patients11. Often, adults 
have provided in advance their decisions regarding their 
preferences in the form of an advanced directive or a 
living will. Even in situations where they have not done 
so, they often will have told the family what they would 
prefer then to do if they were to become incapacitated. 
In such cases, surrogate decision makers must apply the 
principle of substituted judgement. The best interest 
standard is the only guiding principle for medical deci-
sions in pediatrics.
2. The standard of the patient’s best interests
The patient’s best interest standard is to identify the 
greatest net benefit among the different options avai-
lable, assigning different weight to the interests that 
the patient has in each option and subtracting the risks 
or costs inherent in each of the options. Already in the 
first definition of the standard of the best interests ap-
Macmillan, 19953, 387-399, 389-390; Beauchamp, T.L., Childress, J.F., 
Principles of biomedical ethics…, op. cit.135-140; Buchanan, A.E., 
Brock, D.W., Deciding for others…, op. cit., 87-151.
10 Cfr. Davies, J.K., “The concept of precedent autonomy”, 
Bioethics, 16 (2002)114-133.
11 Cfr. Kopelman, L.M., “Children: health care and research…”, 
op. cit., 390. Usually adults may have enumerated how they want 
decisions made by completing
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pears the factors that must be taken into account when 
assigning a treatment seeking the best interests of the 
patient: relief of suffering, preservation or restoration 
of functions, and quality and extension of life12.
Buchanan and Brock’s definition was paradigmatic in 
establishing the conditions of the best interest standard: 
“… Instructs us to determine the net benefit for the pa-
tient of each option, assigning different weights to the 
options to reflect the relative importance of the various 
interests the further or thwart, then subtracting costs 
or “disbenefits” from the benefits for each option. The 
course of action to be followed, then, is the one with 
the greatest net benefit to the patient”13. Buchanan 
and Brock, such as Beauchamp and Childress, insist on 
quality of life (QL) judgments as a fundamental part of 
the patient’s best interests assessment. Beauchamp and 
Childress´ definition is clear: “The best interests standard 
protects an incompetent person’s well-being by requir-
ing surrogates to assess the risks and benefits of various 
treatments and alternatives to treatment. It is therefore 
inescapably a quality-of-life criterion”14.
The best interests is a doctrine that appears first in 
jurisprudence to determine a wide range of issues rela-
ted primarily to the well-being of children. The introduc-
tion of the best interests standard implied that in those 
divorce or dissolution processes, the family courts are ca-
lled upon to assess the best interests of each child in the-
se unions15. A trilogy of books published in the decade 
of the 70s and the end of the 80s had a great influence 
at the time of applying in the courts the standard of 
the best interests16. These books guided the application 
of the standard by judges in the cases of parents who 
refused medical treatment and who were reported by 
12 Cfr. President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Prob-
lems in Medicine and Behavioral Research, Making health care…, 
op. cit., 180.
13 Buchanan, A.E., Brock, D.W., Deciding for others…, op. cit., 
123.
14 Beauchamp, T.L., Childress, J.F., Principles of biomedical eth-
ics…, op. cit., 138.
15 Cfr. Kohm, L.M., “Tracing the foundations of the best in-
terests of the child standard in american jurisprudence”, Journal of 
Law and Family Studies, 10 (2008) 337-376.
16 The three books were gathered in a single book under the 
title “The best interests of the child”. Cfr. Goldstein, J., Solnit, A.J., 
Goldstein, S., Freud A., The best interests of the child. The least 
detrimental alternative, New York, The Free Press, 1996.
doctors. Two characteristics marked this orientation: 1) 
the assessment of individual circumstances required in 
the application of the standard will be based solely on 
the assessment of the patient’s QL in the present and in 
the future after treatment17, and 2) the application of 
the best interests, in cases in which the parents refuse 
medical treatment, was reduced to respect for the auto-
nomy of parents’ decision18.
The best interests standard comes into the medical 
and ethical fields through the neonatology units and, 
more specifically, in decision-making process on withhol-
ding and withdrawing life support treatments (LST). Two 
questions will establish this relationship: 1) Is it ethically 
justifiable to limit LST potentials in the treatment of 
neonates? And, 2) if it is, who has the authority to make 
such decisions?
Three stages can be established in the answers to 
these two questions that coincide with three stages 
in the birth and assumption of the best interests19: 1) 
(1971-1981) A first stage takes place before Baby Doe, 
in which these questions are introduced and several an-
swers are given. One of the answers is the use of the 
best interests standard and its application taking into 
account QL judgments. This may be understood as the 
pre-history of the standard of the best interests in the 
medical field; b) (1982-1988) The definition and assump-
tion of the standard in the pediatric area is marked by 
the “Baby Doe” case, and the legislation established 
as a response to this case. At this stage the best inter-
est standard appears, for the first time, as a guide in 
the decision making process about children in medical 
associations and in declarations of bioethics Councils20 
17 Cfr. Beauchamp, T.L., Childress, J.F., Principles of biomedical 
ethics…, op. cit, 138; Buchanan, A.E., Brock, D.W., Deciding for oth-
ers…, op. cit., 123; Cfr. Kopelman, L.M., “Children: health care and 
research…”, op. cit., 390-391.
18 Cfr. Moos, K., “The ‘Baby Doe’ legislation: it rise and fall”, 
Policy Studies Journal, 15 (1987) 629-651.
19 Placencia, F.X., McCullough, L.B., “The history of ethical de-
cision making in neonatal intensive care”, Journal of Intensive Care 
Medicine, 26 (2011) 368-384, 368.
20 Cfr. President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Prob-
lems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding 
to forego life-sustaining treatment: a report on the ethical, medical, 
and legal issues in treatment decisions, March 1983, Washington 
DC, U.S. Goberment Printing Office, 1983, 217; American Academy 
of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics, “Treatment of critically ill 
newborns”, Pediatrics, 72 (1983) 565-566.
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while, at the same time, it was widely criticized by the 
Reagan administration for its link to the QL concept; c) 
The consecration of the standard of the best interest. 
The standard of the best interests of the child has been 
imposed, above all, from the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (1989), which established it as 
the only standard applicable in pediatric bioethics and 
in all areas of life of the minor21, but not without criti-
cism22. In 2013, the Committee on the Rights of Children 
presented a General Comment No. 14 regarding art. 3 
para.1 in which they tried to explain how to assess and 
determine in each case, what the best interest may be. 
The Committee follows the interpretation of the best 
interests of the child standard as a threefold concept: a 
substantive right, an interpretative legal principle and a 
rule of procedure during the decision-making process23.
3. Criticism and defense of the best interests 
standard
From the very beginning, many authors criticized the 
use of the best interests standard in the field of medical 
decisions. Some authors thought it was a self-destructive 
standard because, taken literally, no decision could be 
put into practice insofar as it would be extremely diffi-
cult to determine whether, in an absolute way, what 
is literally best for the patient24. Others argued that it 
was too individualistic to consider only the interest of a 
person without regard for the rest of the family25. Also 
21 United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989), art. 3. para.1 “In all actions concerning children, whether 
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts 
of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration”.
22 A summary description of these three stages in González-
Melado, F.J., Di Pietro M.L., “El estándar del mejor interés del niño 
en neonatología: ¿es lo mejor para el niño?”, Cuadernos de Bioé-
tica, 26 (2015) 201-222.
23 Cf. Committee on the Rights of the Children, General Com-
ment No 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best 
interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1)*. This 
interpretation has also many criticism. Cfr. Kilkelly, U. (2016). “The 
Best Interests of the Child: A Gateway to Children’s Rights?”, in 
Sutherland, E. - Barnes Macfarlane, L. (Eds.), Implementing Article 
3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Best 
Interests, Welfare and Well-being, Cambridge: Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, Cambridge, 2016, 51-66, [doi:10.1017/9781316662977.004]
24 Cfr. Veatch, R.M., “Abandoning informed consent”, The 
Hastings Center Report, 25 (1995) 5-12.
25 Cfr. Downie, R.S., Randall, F., “Parenting and the best inter-
ests of minors”, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy,22 (1997): 
some authors insisted that it is an unknown standard, 
i.e. can we really know what are the best interests of 
people, especially a child or an incompetent adult?26. In 
the same sense manifested those who believe that it is 
a vague standard, because often the values  that people 
use to judge what is best are not clear, when measu-
ring the benefits or when establishing what amount of 
net benefit is necessary to, for example, continue the 
LST27. It has also been considered a dangerous standard 
which is open to abuse, especially when withholding 
or withdrawing improperly the treatment of disabled 
patients, mainly because relatives and physicians used 
criteria based on QL judgments28. Other authors have 
proposed replacing the QL criterion in the case of chil-
dren, who cannot express how they perceive their QL, 
by the criterion of “social value” that would claim to 
assess the social value that the child’s existence has for 
their parents29.
3.1 Attempts to defend and redefine the best in-
terests standard
Some authors have tried to defend the best interests 
standard by clarifying its meaning and structure (Kopel-
man) or by trying to give it a clearer content (Malek and 
Wilkinson).
In 1997 L. Kopelman defended the best interests 
standard a) as a threshold for intervention in cases of 
child abuse and negligence on the part of parents; b) as 
an ideal to stablish policies actions and to clarify our pri-
ma facie duties, and c) as a standard of reasonableness 
that guides us in the selection of that which maximizes 
the net benefits and minimizes the net damages of the 
child, taking into account the legitimate interests and 
219-231, 230; Martin, W., Freyenhagen, F., Hall, E., O’Shea, T., Szer-
letics, A., Ashley, V., “An unblinkered view of best interests”, British 
Medical Journal, 345 (2012) e8007.
26 Cfr. Brody, H., “In the best interests of”, The Hastings Center 
Report, 18 (1988) 37-39, 38.
27 Cfr. Miller, R.B., Children, ethics and modern medicine, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2003, 120; Salter, E.K., “De-
ciding for a child: a comprehensive analysis of the best interest 
standard”, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 33 (2012) 179-198.
28 Cfr. Koop, C.E., “The Challenge of Definition”, The Hastings 
Center Report, 19 (1989) 2-3.
29 Cfr. Engelhardt, H.T. Jr., “Medicine and the concept of per-
son”, in Beauchamp, T.L., Perlin, S., (eds.), Ethical issues in death and 
dying, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1978, 227.
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the rights of others, within the available options. This 
correction of the standard attempts assume the most 
important criticisms that referred to the absolute and 
individualistic character of the standard, trying to sof-
ten its interpretation so that it is reduced to a standard 
of reasonableness for medical decisions on incompetent 
minors30.
In 2005, coinciding with the 20th anniversary of 
the amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act, Kopelman wrote an extensive article in 
which she advocates a negative analysis of the standard 
of the best interests for decision making regarding in-
competent individuals31. According to Kopelman the ne-
gative version of the best interests standard: a) instructs 
those who are entrusted with decisions what action ope-
rates in favor of the immediate and long-term interests 
of the incompetent individual, and to maximize their 
net benefit and minimize their net burden, arguing that 
this action should be considered as prima faccie duty; 
b) it presupposes a consensus among reasonable and 
30 Cfr. Kopelman, L.M., “The best interests standard as thresh-
old, ideal, an standard of reasonableness”, The Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy, 22 (1997) 281-289.
31 Kopelman, L.M., “Rejecting the Baby Doe rules and defend-
ing a ‘negative’ analysis of the Best Interests Standard”, The Journal 
of Medicine and Philosophy, 30 (2005) 331-352.
informed people, of goodwill, about which choices are 
not acceptable, for the incompetent individual, conside-
ring all the elements, and c) determines the objective of 
the best interests in terms of established moral or legal 
rights for incompetent individuals.
Given the criticism that the best interest standard 
is vague and unknown, some authors have wanted to 
give it a more precise content. J. Malek proposes, after 
a comparative study of three sources, a list of thirteen 
basic interests of all children that can help to defend the 
best interests standard of subjectivity, individual prefe-
rences, beliefs or prejudices of physicians32. We reprodu-
ce in Table 1 the list of interests of Malek.
D. Wilkinson has recently tried to give a new content 
to the best interests standard answering two problems: 
The first is that protocols do not serve in critical de-
cisions, and the second one is that the best interests 
standard limits the participation of parents in the de-
cision-making process. Wilkinson proposes a reading of 
the best interests from two thresholds: a “upper thres-
hold” where the child’s prognosis is good enough for 
treatment to be mandatory, and a “lower threshold”, 
32 Cfr. Malek, J., “What really is in a child’ s best interest? 
Toward a more precise picture of the interests of children”, The 
Journal of Clinical Ethics, 20 (2009) 175-182, 180.
Table 1. Interests of children
1.- Life: To life and to anticipate a life of normal human length
2.- Health and healthcare: To have good health and protection from pain, injury, and illness. To have access to medical care.
3.- Basic needs: To have and adequate standard of living, especially to be adequately nourished and sheltered.
4.- Protection from neglect and abuse: To be protected from physical or mental abuse, neglect, exploitation, and exposure to 
dangerous environments. To be secure that they will be safe and cared for.
5.- Emotional development: To experience emotion and have appropriate emotional development. 
6.- Play and pleasure: To play, rest, and enjoy recreational activities. To have pleasure experiences.
7.- Education and cognitive development: To have an education that includes information from diverse sources. To have the ability 
to learn, think, imagine, and reason.
8.- Expression and communication: To have the ability to express themselves and to communicate thoughts adn feelings.
9.- Interaction: To interact and care for others and the world around them. To have secure, empathetic, intimate, and consistent 
relationships with others.
10.- Parental relationships: To know and interact with their parents.
11.- Identity: To have an identity and connection to their culture. To be protected from discrimination.
12.- Sense of self: To have a sense of self, self-worth, and self-respect.
13.- Autonomy: To have the ability to influence the course of their live. To act intentionally and with self-discipline. To reflect on 
the direction and meaning of their lives.
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below which the child’s prognosis is so poor that parents 
should not be allowed to decide on treatment, and that 
treatment should be discontinued by physicians regard-
less of parental opinion (Figure 1). Between these two 
thresholds, there is a grey area. This is the area where 
both morality and treatment uncertainties are located. 
This is the area where the family can participate in the 
decision making process. Wilkinson’s redefinition of the 
best interests is limited to the introduction of proto-
cols that signal both the lower threshold and the upper 
threshold, leaving the decision to parents only within 
the grey zone of uncertainty33.
33 Wilkinson, D., Death or Disability? The “Carmentis Machine” 
and decision-making for critically ill children, Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2013; A similar proposal to Wilkinson’s can be found 
in Rhodes, R., Holzman, I.R., “Is the best interest standard good for 
pediatrics?”, Pediatrics 134 (2014) S121-S129, where through several 
cases they present the weaknesses of the best interest standard 
and defend their three-box model: at one extreme is the box for 
the set of cases that are likely to have poor outcomes regardless 
of the interventions that are tried, and physicians should and do 
encourage surrogates to withhold or discontinue treatment; at the 
opposite extreme is the box for the set of cases in which treatment 
promises a likely and significant medical benefit, whereas refusal of 
treatment is very likely to result in significant harm and surrogates 
should not be allowed the authority to impose their own personal 
values, and when a surrogate’s choice would clearly subvert any 
universal treatment goal, the choice must be rejected; and a middle 
box, when nothing crucial turns on the decision or when reasonable 
people could accept or refuse the treatment option, medical should 
accept the decisions of surrogates.
Neither Kopelman nor Malek nor Wilkinson respond 
satisfactorily to criticism. On the one hand, Kopelman 
does not define who has to make the decisions and she 
establishes the formula of the consensus as criterion 
of the decisions on the treatments that should not be 
applied because they are not acceptable. This does not 
correct the danger of an abuse of the standard, by not 
establishing objective criteria, when defining what kind 
of decisions are not acceptable. As far as content is con-
cerned, it is clear that Malek’s list of interests is as subjec-
tive as the beliefs, prejudices and preferences of doctors 
which want to be avoided. What Malek does is to replace 
the table of values that each doctor has, in particular, by 
the table of values of her consulted sources. Finally in 
Wilkinson, the main problem is the direct relation that is 
established between the QL and the decisions on LST. The 
prognosis used to establish the thresholds is a QL-based 
prognosis understood as personal autonomy, with the 
absence of suffering and intellectual values. It is this QL 
concept, when deciding whether or not to treat seriously 
ill newborns, which makes Wilkinson’s approach highly 
problematic from an ethical point of view34.
34 Gonzalez-Melado, F.J., “Wilkinson D., Death or Disability? 
The “Carmentis Machine” and decision-making for critically ill chil-
dren. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2013”, Theoretical Medicine 
 35 
 
 
 
Figure 1.- ‘‘The threshold framework’’ proposed by D. Wilkinson.  
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Figure 1. ‘‘The threshold framework’’ proposed by D. Wilkinson. (Figure drawing it by the authors of this paper).
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3.2. The necessity of redefining the best interests 
standard
In recent years, in some cases there have been en-
trenched disagreements between parents and clinicians, 
and these have received a great deal of media and aca-
demic attention35. One may recall the cases of Ashya 
King36, Charlie Gard37, Alphie Evans38, or more recently, 
and Bioethics, 36 (2015) 363-368.
35 Adult cases, such as Vincent Lambert’s one, have also attrac-
ted the mass media attention, but these cases are usually resolved 
using the substituted or surrogated judgment standard.
36 Ashya was diagnosed with an aggressive brain tumor known 
as medulloblastoma, and had to have brain surgery. Doctors recom-
mended he also have chemotherapy and radiotherapy as part of 
his treatment, although Ashya’s parents Brett and Naghemeh King 
rejected that treatment and wanted to try proton therapy – which 
wasn’t available in the UK at the time – instead. Brett and Naghemeh 
– during one of the allocated times Ashya was allowed to be taken 
home – left Southampton General Hopsital on 28 August 2014 with 
their son and boarded a ferry to France. When they didn’t return, an 
international alert was set up to find the boy, and a manhunt began. 
The King family were eventually found in Malaga (Spain), Ashya was 
taken to a local hospital while his parents were detained in a jail. 
They were later released as the request to extradite them to the UK 
was denied. It was found that the threat to Ashya’s life was not as 
serious as once thought. After this, Brett and Naghemeh took the 
case to the High Court, and on 5 September 2014 it was ruled that 
they could take Ashya to Prague for proton therapy, which they did 
shortly after. At November of 2019, Ashya shows no signs of cancer. 
Cfr. [https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ashya-king]
37 Charlie Gard was an 11-month-old British infant with infan-
tile-onset mitochondrial DNA depletion syndrome. While his par-
ents and medical team were pursuing options for investigational 
nucleoside therapy, Charlie’s condition deteriorated. His medical 
team then determined further treatment was not in Charlie’s best 
interests, and a judge agreed. His parents petitioned to transfer 
Charlie’s care to the United States for experimental therapy, but the 
Court held that this transfer was not in Charlie’s best interests and 
that life support should be stopped. After an expert consultation 
revealed it was too late for the experimental treatment, the parents 
sought to take Charlie home to die. The Court ordered Charlie be 
moved to hospice care instead, and he died shortly after treat-
ment was withdrawn. Cfr. Shad, S.K., Rosemberg, A.R., Diekema, 
D.S., “Charlie Gard and the limits of Best Interests”, JAMA Pediat-
rics 171(2017) 937-938; Cfr. High Court of Justice Family División, 
Great Ormond Street Hospital and Constance Yates, Christopher 
Gard, and Charlie Gard, (2017) EWHC 972 (Fam.). No. FD17P00103. 
11 April 2017, section 53. See also European Court of Human Rights, 
Charles Gard and Others against the United Kingdom. Application 
no. 39793. 3 July 2017, p.2, point 4.
38 Alfie was born on 9 May 2016. He was first admitted to 
Alder Hey Children’s Hospital in Liverpool in December 2016. Doc-
tors diagnosed a degenerative neurological condition, which they 
have not been able to identify definitively. Alfie’s parents and the 
hospital clashed over what should happen to Alfie, who had been 
in a semi-vegetative state for more than a year. His parents said 
they wanted to fly him to a hospital in Italy but this was blocked 
by Alder Hey Hospital, which said continuing treatment was “not 
in Alfie’s best interests”. The Alder Hey Children’s Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust went to the High Court to seek a declaration that 
“continued ventilator support is not in Alfie’s best interests and, in 
these circumstances, it is not lawful that such treatment continue”. 
Mr. Justice Hayden ruled in favor of hospital bosses, and doctors 
were set to withdraw ventilation on 23 February before his parents 
embarked on a lengthy legal battle. Alfie’s parents refused to give 
Tafida Raqueeb39. These cases have returned the best 
interests standard to the center of the bioethical debate 
regarding its usefulness, its content and the possible al-
ternatives to the use of the best interests standard40. A 
brief analysis of the current proposals on the content of 
the standard of best interest, allows us to identify four 
different groups (Table 2):
1) The first group collects the proposals that consider 
the best interests standard as determined by patient’s 
clinical needs. In this group, it can be found in the 
English Law, and the particular court that applies it such 
as the High Court of Justice Family Division of the United 
Kingdom, which understands the best interest standard 
only in an objective way41; Winters proposes a “thin-
king list” as a tool for making decisions in situations 
of uncertainty and complexity42; a group of bioethics 
specialists that substitute the best interest standard for 
the “harm principle”43, and Lynn Gillam who intended 
up hope and took the case to the Court of Appeal on 6 March 
where judges upheld Mr. Justice Hayden’s decision. On 20 March, 
the couple appealed to the Supreme Court where justices refused 
to give the couple permission to mount another appeal. Despite 
this, their lawyers went to the European Court of Human Rights 
after exhausting all legal avenues in the UK. But three judges ruled 
the submission “inadmissible”, saying they were unable to find any 
violation of human rights. On 11 April, Mr. Justice Hayden then 
endorsed an end-of-life care plan for Alfie, setting a date to switch 
off life support. On 23 April, Alfie’s life support was turned off at 
21:00 after a High Court judge dismissed fresh submissions heard in 
private from lawyers. Alfie’s father had said his son was continuing 
to breathe unassisted and his life support should be reinstated. 
Alfie died at 2:30 a.m. on 28 April 2018. Cfr. [https://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-england-merseyside-43754949].
39 Tafida suffered a traumatic brain injury in February 2019 
and clinicians at the Royal London Hospital in Whitechapel said 
there is no hope for her, and being allowed to die is in her best in-
terests. Tafida’s mother, Shelina Begum, and her father, Mohammed 
Raqeeb, wanted to seek treatment in Italy. Tafida’s parents, took 
the case to the High Court. Mr. Justice MacDonald handed down 
his judgment in the High Court, holding that continuation of medi-
cal treatment was in Tafida Raqeeb’s best interests. The effect of 
this decision being that she can be treated in Italy, in line with the 
wishes of her parents. Cfr. [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
uk/home-news/tafida-raqeeb-court-result-life-support-italy-brain-
injury-age-disability-latest-a9136031.html].
40 In addition to countless articles published on the subject, 
recently two important bioethical journals have dedicated mono-
graphic to this issue: Cfr. The American Journal of Bioethics, 18 
(2018); The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 30 (2019).
41 Cfr. The Children Act 1989 section 1 (3-4); High Court of 
Justice Family División, “Great Ormond Street Hospital…” cit.
42 Cfr. Winters, J.P., “When parents refuse: resolving en-
trenched disagreements between parents and clinicians in situa-
tions of uncertainty and complexity”, The American Journal of Bio-
ethics, 18 (2018) 20-31.
43 In this movement it can be find Diekema, Salter, Shah, El-
linston and De Vos, and others. Cfr. Diekema, D.S, “Decision making 
on behalf of children understanding the role of the harm prin-
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her Zone of Parental Discretion as a tool for putting the 
harm principle into practice44. Birchley refers to all these 
authors, who support the “harm principle”, as a move-
ment within bioethics that he refers to as the “harm 
consensus”45.
2) The second group is made up of those specialists 
who understand that the best interest standard has to 
take into account a subjective evaluation of the patient’s 
wider social and welfare preferences, separately and 
subsequently to the doctor’s determination of the clini-
cal interest. In this group, we can find Ross’s defense of 
the best interest standard, which implies the modifica-
tion of the standard in what she calls “the constrained 
parental autonomy”, which consists in promoting and 
protecting the child’s primary goods or basic needs46. 
Edmund Howe also can be put into this group by his 
intention to implant Ross’s theory in a practical way47.
3) The third group understand the best interest stan-
dard as an objective evaluation of what the “reasona-
ble” patient’s preferences would be, if the patient in 
question’s view are not known. In this group, it can be 
found: Kopelman48; Bester and his defense of the best 
interests standard rejecting the harm principle49; Hub-
ciple”, The Journal of Clinical Ethics 30 (2019) 207-212; Diekema, 
D.S. “Parental Refusals of mediacla treatment: the harm principle 
as a threshold for state intervention”, Theroetical Medicine and 
Bioethics, 25 (2004) 243-264; Salter, E.K., “When better isn’t good 
enough: commentary on Ross’s ‘Better than best (interest standard) 
in pediatric decision making”, The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 30 
(2019) 213-217; Shah, S.K, “Charlie Gard and the limits …”, cit.; 
Ellinston, S, The best interests of the child in helthcare. London: 
Routledge Cavendish, 2007; de Vos, M.A., Seeber, A.A., Gevers, S.K. 
et al., “Parents who wish no futher treatment for their child”, The 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 41 (2015) 195-200; 
44 Cfr. Gillam, L., “The zone of parental discretion: an ethical 
tool for dealing with disagreement between parents and doctors 
about medical treatment for a child”, Clinical Ethics, 11 (2016) 1-8.
45 Cfr. Birchley, G. “Harm is all you need? Best interests and 
disputes about parental decision-making”, The Journal of Medical 
Ethics, 42 (2016) 111-115.
46 Cfr. Ross, L.F., “Better than best (interest standard) in pedi-
atric decision making”, The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 30 (2019) 183-
195; Paquette, E.T., Ross, L.F., “Pediatric decision making requires 
both guidance and intervention principles”, The American Journal 
of Bioethics, 18 (2018) 44-46.
47 Cfr. Howe, E.G., “Treating children maximally: practical ap-
plications”, The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 30 (2019) 171-182.
48 Cfr. Kopelman, L.M, “Why the best interest standard is not 
self-defeating, too individualistic, unknowable, vague or subjec-
tive”, The American Journal of Bioethics, 18 (2018) 34-36
49 Cfr. Bester, J.C., “The best interest standard is the best we 
have: why the harm principle and constrained parental autonomy 
cannot replace the best interest standard in pediatric ethics”, The 
Journal of Clinical Ethics, 30 (2019) 223-231; Bester, J.C., “The harm 
berd and Greenblum that critic the weakness of Bester’s 
standard and replace it with three commonly held prin-
ciples of biothics – autonomy, beneficence, non-malefi-
cence- and a standard of reasonableness50; Baines who 
considered the best interests standard as a “reasonable” 
assessment of the individual child’s interests51; Millum 
and his proposition that parents should decide for their 
child as the child would if she were a moral agent trying 
to act prudently within the constrains of morality52, and 
Hester who proposes to substitute the best interest stan-
dard for a “reasonable interests standard”53.
4) In the fourth group are those who understand the 
best interests standard as a conflation of both clinical 
and wider welfare issues. In this group can be situa-
ted Malek, Wilkinson, Coulson-Smith et al.54, along with 
Rhodes and Holzman with their “three boxes theory”55.
These four groups respond to two fundamental fra-
meworks of current pediatric bioethics:
a) The first framework, which corresponds to the 
first group, wants to replace the best standard interest 
with the “harm principle”. The main criticism to this 
framework is that while defining the State intervention 
threshold well, it does not exhaust all the possibilities 
for the best decision, thus excluding parents from deci-
sion-making process and focusing only on the patient’s 
medical good. Using the “harm principle”, a decision 
could be made which assumes that continuing to live is 
a “harm” for the patient, and the best option is to leave 
the child to die.
principle cannot replace the best interest standard: problems with 
using the harm principle for medical decision making for children”, 
The American Journal of Bioethics, 18 (2018) 9-19. 
50 Cfr. Hubbard, R, Greenblum, J., “Parental decision making: 
the best intests principle, child autonomy, and reasonableness”, 
HEC Forum, acces online [https://doi.org/10.1007/s10730-019-09373-
9]
51 Cfr. Baines, P., “Family interest and medical decisions for 
children”, Bioethics, 31 (2017) 599-607.
52 Cfr. Millum, J.,The moral foundations of parenthood, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2018; Millum, J., “The ‘reasonable 
subject standard’ as an alternative to the ‘best interest standard’”, 
The American Journal of Bioethics, 18 (2018) 66-67.
53 Cfr. Hester, D.M., “Offering the ‘reasonable intersts stan-
dard’ in response to Ross’s analysis of the best interests standard”, 
The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 30 (2019) 196-200;
54 Cfr. Coulson-Smith P., Fenwick, A., Lucassen, A., “In defense 
of best interests: When parents and clinicians disagree”, The Ameri-
can Journal of Bioethics, 18 (2018) 67-69.
55 Cfr. Rhodes, R., Holzman, I.R., “Is the best interest standard 
good…”, cit., S121-S129.
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b) The second framework, which corresponds to the 
other three groups, maintains the best interest of the 
child as the main standard but by redefining its con-
tent: some authors limit the parental decision-making 
autonomy (second group); others establish as a content 
the standard of reasonableness in their different ver-
sions (third group) and, finally, there are those who 
want to facilitate decision making with tools that assess 
the child’s clinical situation, possible treatment options 
and parental values (fourth group). The main criticisms, 
from these three groups, is the difficulty to establishing 
some criteria to determine what the best reasonable op-
tion may be, and how different parents have different 
values and perceptions about what is the best for their 
children. In the face of these difficulties, physicians have 
found a shortcut in their application of QL judgments, 
Table 2. Current theories for the best interest standard on pediatric fild.
Group Theory Authors Criticism
First 
group
The harm principle = clinicians should invoke the harm 
principle if and only if intervening is necessary to 
prevent a significant risk of serious harm to a child and 
is reasonably likely to prevent that harm compared with 
the alternatives.
High Court of Justice 
Familiy Division;
Dikema, D.S;
Shad, S.K;
Elliston, S.;
De Vos, M.A. et al.;
Winters, J.P.
Focus on the patient’s medical 
good.
Do not exhausted all 
possibilities for the best 
option.
Exclude parents from decision-
making process.Zone of Parental Discretion as a tool for putting the 
harm principle into practice.
Gillam, L.
Second 
group
Constrained parental autonomy = promoting and 
protecting the child’s primary goods or basic needs. 
Ross, L.F. Vague and unknown.
Difficulties to establish a 
hierarchy on the primary 
goods or basic needs.
Subjective preferences over 
what are children’s basic 
needs
Supports Ross’s standard and offers some suggestions 
to putting into practice.
Howe, E.
A list of thirteen basics interests of children Malek, J.
Third 
group
The best interests standard as a threshold for 
intervention, as an ideal to stablish policies actions as a 
standard of reasonableness.
Kopelman, L.M. Do not decided who has to 
make decisions.
Do not established criteria in 
order to correct the danger of 
an abuse of the standard.
Do not defined what kind of 
decisions are not acceptable.
Defends the best interests standard as an option or 
range of options that protect the interest of the child 
better than any alternative.
Bester, J.C.
Tree principles – autonomy, beneficence and non-
maleficence – and a principle of reasonableness, 
properly weighed. 
Hubberd, R. and 
Greenblum, J.
As a “reasonable” assessment of the individual child’s 
interests
Baines, P.
The “reasonable Subject Standard” = parents should 
decide for their child as the child would if she were a 
moral agent trying to act prudently within the constrain 
of morality. 
Millum, J.
“Reasonable Interests standard” = the analysis of the 
morality of decision making for children must account for 
three conditions: Threshold (interventional) condition, 
aspirational (guidance) condition, and pragmatic 
(reasonable) condition.
Hester, D.M., et al.
Fourth 
group
The two thresholds: an “upper threshold” and a “lower 
threshold”. In the middle a grey area.
Wilkinson, D. Relation between the QL 
and decisions on withhold 
or withdraw LST in disabled 
patients or children.To adopt the broadest view of the best interest, trying 
to understand the particular experiences, expectations, 
and nuances in each unique case.
Coulson-Smith, P. et al
The three-box model Rhodes, R. and Holzman, 
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insofar as to be able to decide what the “best reasona-
ble option” is for a patient, and the best interests stan-
dard has become an utilitarian standard that attempts 
to determine whether the patient’s life after treatment 
will be a “life worth living”, especially when deciding 
to withhold or withdraw the LST of a disabled patient 
or a child.
For all these reasons, we consider that it is necessary 
to redefine the best interest as a standard so that it 
can respond to the bioethical problems of minor and 
incompetent patients56. This redefinition has to correct 
deviations from the best interest standard of the child:
1.- Promoting a correct ethical framework for the 
application of a bioethics that responds to the needs of 
minors and incompetent adults patients57.
2.- Establishing the necessary clinical criteria for the 
application of the standard, that is to say, it tries to an-
swer the question: when is it necessary to apply the best 
interests standard?
3.- To determine who is responsible for the applica-
tion of the standard and the role of the family in the 
decision-making process.
4.- Finally, it will be necessary to provide a new con-
tent to the best interests, which allows us to answer 
the question: how to apply the best interests? This new 
content will serve to define what is the best treatment 
and justify why we consider it to be the best possible 
treatment.
4. Redefining the best interests of the child as 
an applicable standard
Daniel Callahan raised in 1991 what he called “the 
problem without a name”58 to refer to a series of limi-
ting situations that arise in medicine. The problem that 
56 Cfr. González-Melado, F.J., Di Pietro, M.L., “El estándar del 
mejor interés del niño…”, op. cit., 219; Salter, E.K., “Deciding for 
a child: a comprehensive analysis of the best interest standard”, 
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 33 (2012): 179-188.
57 Cfr. González-Melado, F.J., “Family Centered Bioethics: a 
new bioethical framework for decision-making in neonatal and pe-
diatric units”, Journal of Clinical Research and Bioethics, 7 (2016) 
1-5.
58 Cfr. Callahan, D., “Medical futility, medical necessity. The-
problem-without-a-name”, The Hastings Center Report, 21 (1991) 
30-35.
always appears, in these limiting situations, is to know 
what technical treatments benefit the patient and can 
be instituted and which must be rejected because of 
the risks involved. The patient’s best interest standard 
would be the standard that would have to be used only 
in these limiting situations with incompetent patients.
Fortunately these limiting situations are not the only 
ones that are given in medicine. There are situations 
where treatment is clearly indicated and effective for 
incompetent patients. It is clear that in these situations, 
neither the physician nor the family has a need to apply 
the standard of the best interests, but simply to proceed 
with the administration of the treatment, with the con-
sent of the family.
It is in situations in which there is uncertainty about 
the treatment or the prognosis of the disease, that is 
to say in those situations in which proportionality judg-
ments must be elaborated59, where the standard of the 
best interests would come into play. As currently defi-
ned, this standard is not sufficient to ensure a correct 
analysis of the problematic cases by its almost exclusive 
dependence on QL judgments.
We consider that only a correct interpretation and 
redefinition of the standard of the best interests, and 
its relationship with QL, will allow us to use this stan-
dard correctly. The redefinition that we propose of the 
standard of best interest is based on two concepts: the 
concept of medical futility and the principle of propor-
tionality.
4.1. Futility as a bridge concept between clinic and 
medical ethics
E. Pellegrino proposed that the correct use of the 
term futility, as a prudential clinical judgment, could 
be used as a bridge between the ethical formulation of 
proportionality judgments and the decisions to withhol-
ding or withdrawal treatments at the end of life60. In de-
59 Cfr. Taboada, P., “El principio de proporcionalidad terapéu-
tica en las decisiones de limitar tratamientos”, Boletín Escuela de 
Medicina, 27(1998)17-23.
60 Cfr. Pellegrino, E.D., “Decision at the end of life: the use 
and abuse of the concept of futility”, in Vial Correa, J.D., Sgreccia, 
E. (eds.), The dignity of the dying person. Proccedings of the fifth 
assembly of the Pontifical Academy for life, Ciudad del Vaticano, 
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fining the concept of futility, Pellegrino distinguishes at 
least two meanings: 1) a general notion, in which futility 
means the inability to achieve the proposed goal, and 
2) a clinical sense, where futility means that a disease 
has progressed to a point where the proposed medical 
intervention may not serve the good of the patient.
4.1.1. The general notion of futility
The Latin word fut [t] ilis means “to let out its con-
tent [referring to the vessel]. Fragile, brittle. Futile, vain, 
light, frivolous; without authority. Man without founda-
tion. Useless, without effect “. The etymology of futilitas 
is related to the verb fundo, “to pour “, to try to carry a 
liquid in a container that drops its content61. The futile 
action is not simply useless, but involves an effort and 
a time that will not get any fruit. Therefore it would 
be a relative term; we say that something is futile not 
because it is useless in itself, but because it is incapable 
of reaching the goal for which that medium has been 
proposed.
4.1.2. Futility in the medical field
More than 3,500 years ago, medicine recognized the 
existence of futile treatments as a clinical fact with moral 
implications, although it is true that the concept as such 
was not coined. Hippocratic doctors also recognized the 
futile treatments and advised against treatment when 
the patient had been “dominated” by the disease. The-
refore the concept as such was present in medicine as 
a clinical criterion, applied unilaterally by the physician 
in critical situations about the prolongation of life. The 
moral force of non-application of a useless treatment 
derives, in the Hippocratic tradition, from the principle 
of beneficence62.
It is in the last quarter of the 20th century when 
the moral problem of the futility of treatments and the 
invention of the term become an important topic of 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2000, 219-241.
61 Segura Munguía, S., Diccionario Etimológico Latino-Espa-
ñol, Madrid, Ediciones Generales Anaya, 1985.
62 Cfr. Pellegrino, E.D., “Decision at the end of life...”, op. cit., 
223-224.
debate within medical ethics63. The debate about futility 
is not only a consequence of the medical advances in 
the LST, but is also a consequence of the change that 
occurs in the doctor’s authority when the principle of 
the patient’s autonomy is assumed in bioethics64. We 
can verify this change when analyzing the most known 
judicial cases that demanded the suspension of the LST 
between the decades of the eighties and nineties of last 
century. The most famous cases of the eighties are cases 
in which patients, or relatives, ask for the suspension of 
a treatment against the opinion of doctors. However, in 
the most famous cases of the 1990s, there is an inver-
sion of the terms: now the doctors are presented with 
complaints when they request that the treatments have 
to be withdrawn while the patients, or relatives, are 
the ones who ask to continue the treatments. Medical 
criteria are sought that seek the justification of denial, 
withdrawal, treatment and defense of the physicians so 
that they are not obliged to offer a treatment that they 
consider useless65. The term “futility” arises, therefore, 
as a defensive response of the autonomy of the doctors 
against the autonomy of the patient66.
The debate will focus on who should define futility 
(the doctor, patient, or family members who make su-
rrogate decisions), how futility should be defined, and 
what to do when physician, patient, or family disagrees 
with its definition. All of this debate led to the elabora-
tion of a series of operational definitions of futility, that 
is, definitions that could be applied to specific cases that 
appear in critical situations.
We are able to group the different definitions into 
four groups: a) futility in the physiological sense; b) 
quantitative and qualitative futility; c) social and econo-
mic futility, and d) integrative definitions of futility. It is 
necessary to add a fifth group in which would be all of 
63 Cfr. Burns, J.P., Truog, R.D., “Futility: a concept in evolu-
tion”, Chest, 132 (2007) 1987-1993.
64 Cfr. Helft, P.R., Siegler, M., Lantos, J., “The rise and fall of 
the futility movement”, The New England Journal of Medicine, 343 
(2000) 293-296.
65 Cfr. Pellegrino, E.D., “Patient autonomy and the physician’s 
ethics”, Annals Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, 
27 (1994)171-173. 
66 Cfr. Hook, C.C., “Medical Futility”, in Kilner, J. et al., (eds.), 
Dignity and dying: a christian appraisal, Michigan, Paternoster 
Press, 1996, 84-95, 87.
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those who are of the opinion that futility is not a useful 
concept, since the application of the treatments depends 
solely on the patient, or those who, although considered 
futility as a useful concept, do not believe that a defini-
tion which could be accepted by all is possible 67.
Physiological futility68 defines that a treatment is futile 
when it does not achieve the desired physiological effect; 
the treatment does not offer benefits to the patient and, 
therefore, the doctor is not obliged to offer it. The main 
criticism of this definition is that it adds little to the usual 
practice and would only be useful in cases where the fa-
mily insists on treatment against a physician’s opinion. It 
does not avoid the problem of the therapeutic binge, and 
could even encourage it, having a vision centered on the 
organ and not on the “person as a whole”69.
Quantitative and qualitative futility tries to evaluate 
two independent thresholds, one quantitative and the 
other qualitative, so that if the treatment does not ex-
ceed one of these two thresholds the physician should 
not offer the therapy70. The quantitative threshold at-
tempts to examine the objective aspects of treatment. 
For example, in an analysis of the last one-hundred ca-
ses collected in the literature, if from the experience, it 
would be concluded that the treatment has only been 
useful in one of the cases, the physicians should consi-
der the treatment as futile. The qualitative threshold 
attempts to assess the subjective aspects of treatment. 
The qualitative threshold will be determined by the 
physician’s evaluation of the patient’s present and futu-
re QL. Both the quantitative threshold and the qualita-
tive threshold are defined and evaluated by the physi-
67 Cfr. Iceta, M., Futilidad y toma de decisiones en medicina 
paliativa, Córdoba, Caja Sur, 1997, 191.
68 Cfr. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs - American 
Medical Association, “Guidelines for the appropriate use of do-
not-resuscitate orders”, JAMA, 265 (1991) 1868-1871; The Hastings 
Center, Guidelines on the termination of life-sustaining treatment 
and the care of the dying, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 
1987; Truog, R.D., Brett, A.S., Frader, J., “The problem with futil-
ity”, The New England Journal of Medicine, 326 (1992;) 1560-1564; 
American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Fetus and Newbor, 
“The initiation or withdrawal of treatment for high-risk newborns”, 
Pediatrics, 96 (1995) 362-363.
69 Cfr. Schneiderman, L.J., Jecker, N.S., “CPR-not-indicated and 
futility”, Annals of Internal Medicine, 124 (1996) 75-77.
70 Cfr. Schneiderman, L.J., Jecker, N.S., Jonsen, A.R., “Medical 
futility: its meaning and ethical implications”, Annals of Internal 
Medicine, 112 (1990;) 949-954.
cian. These thresholds have presented many critics but 
were however quickly accepted and incorporated into 
the guidelines of some medical associations. The quan-
titative dimension does not seem to take into account 
the problems of data interpretation, bias in the study 
of populations, statistics regarding the probability of 
survival, and ultimately the difficulty of determining if 
in one-hundred of the last cases the result has been un-
satisfactory71. Regarding the qualitative threshold, the 
truth is that it wants to be objective, defined by the 
doctor, but at the end it falls into subjectivity when eva-
luating the patient’s QL72.
c) social or economic futility integrates not only clini-
cal data but also the economic costs73. This kind of futi-
lity would try to establish a rationalization of resources 
through a definition of futility by social consensus. The 
main criticism that the authors make of the criterion of 
social or economic futility is that they confuse the plans 
of rationalization of resources (social plane) with that of 
futility (clinical problem)74.
d) Integrative definitions of futility, integrate the 
different elements that appear as central in other de-
finitions75. It is about including both objective criteria, 
which belong to the physicians, and subjective criteria, 
which belong to the patient. The problem is that the fu-
tility thus understood loses its objective character. When 
integrating the physiological, quantitative and qualita-
tive elements, when considering the costs and the eco-
nomic expenses, are also incorporating all the negative 
considerations that these definitions present.
e) The futility of the futility concept76. One group of 
authors consider that the concept of futility would be 
the new name of an old problem, namely that at a given 
71 Cfr. Nelson, S.N., “Do everything! Encountering ‘futility’ in 
medical practice”, Ethics & Medicine, 19 (2003) 103-113, 106.
72 Cfr. Harper, W., “Judging who should live: Schneiderman 
an Jecker on the duty not to treat”, The Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, 23 (1998) 500-515, 512.
73 Cfr. Murphy, D.J., Finucane, T.E., “New do-not-resuscitate 
policies. A first step in cost control”, Archives of Internal Medicine, 
153 (1993) 1641-1648, 1644.
74 Cfr. Jecker, N.S., “Medical futility: a paradigm analysis”, HEC 
forum, an Interdisciplinary Journal on Hospitals’ Ethical and Legal 
Issues, 19 (2007) 13-32, 23.
75 Cfr. Iceta, M., Futilidad y toma de decisiones…, op. cit., 191.
76 Cfr. Brody, B.A., Halevy, A., “Is futility a futile concept?”, 
The Journal of Medicine and Philososphy, 20 (1995) 123-144.
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time the physician cannot give a treatment that worsens 
the patient’s condition, has no efficacy, or that its side 
effects are much more harmful than the benefits that are 
sought. Understood as such, the concept of futility would 
be a useless concept because it was already present in a 
practical way in medicine, and it should be replaced with 
other concepts that better respect the patient’s partici-
pation in the decision as risk-benefit balance, medically 
appropriate or the best interests of the patient.
4.1.3. The only possible bridge: physiological fu-
tility
Given the various proposals of futility that we have 
presented, our question is: can these concepts of futility 
be bridges that connect medical ethics with decisions 
about to withhold or withdraw the LST? What concept 
of futility serves to configure the first element in the 
redefinition of the best interests standard? The applica-
tion of different definitions, with different values and 
probabilities of success, has undermined the foundations 
of the concept of “futility”77. The promise of objectivity, 
which was sought in the bioethical debate of the term 
futility, has not been achieved. Only physiological futility 
can serve as a bridging concept between bioethics and 
decisions about withholding or withdrawing the LST.
In presenting physiological futility as a bridge bet-
ween medical ethics and decisions to withhold or with-
draw the LST, we understand that defining the futility 
of treatment is only the first step in the decision process. 
It is the objective step, focused on the identification of 
treatments that should not be applied. The criticisms 
made about ignoring the whole person and not taking 
into account the preferences of the patient, will be over-
come when we incorporate the second element in the 
redefinition of the best interests: the principle of pro-
portionality.
4.2. The principle of proportionality
The proportionality of treatments is a solid term in 
77 Cfr. Truog, R.D., Brett, A.S., Frader, J., “The problem with 
futility…”, op. cit. 1562.
the bioethical debate78 and it is only the last crystalli-
zation of a long process of reflection that, within the 
Jewish-Christian tradition, has wanted to identify the 
ethical criteria that can guide us in the decisions about 
limiting or withdrawing treatments in a particular medi-
cal situation, and to stablish the patient’s moral obliga-
tion to care for and preserve his own life.
4.2.1 Historical and systematic roots of traditional 
moral teaching
From the origins of Christianity, the existence of a 
“positive” moral duty to care for health and life has 
been recognized79. This reflection on the moral duties 
of preserving physical life had been welcomed by six-
teenth-century moralists who, starting from the com-
mentaries to Aquinas, developed the traditional dis-
tinction between ordinary and extraordinary measures 
of preserving life. Francisco de Vitoria [1486-1546], Do-
mingo de Soto [1494-1570] and Cardinal Juan de Lugo 
[1583-1660], structured the formal application of these 
concepts to new medical therapies. Vitoria justifies the 
duty to use medical treatments on the moral certainty 
of possible benefits, preserving health or preventing an 
avoidable death. He even argues that when the use of 
medicine serves only to prolong life, the patient could 
be exempted from the moral duty to use such treatment 
if there are conditions that cause him moral impossibili-
ty, such as an excessive economic cost80.
The writings of Vitoria recognize at least two requi-
rements that tradition has accepted as a basis for the 
moral obligation of ordinary means of preservation of 
life: a) the hope of obtaining a reasonable profit (spes 
salutis/vitae)81; and b) the absence of a physical or mo-
ral impossibility for its use by the individual (quaedam 
impossibilitas)82. Tradition considers that the two condi-
78 Cfr. Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, Declara-
tion on Euthanasia Iura et bona (05.05.1980), n. 27.
79 Basilius Magnus, Regulae Furius Tractae, 398 ed. Migne, J.P., 
Pratologiae Graecae XXXI.
80 De Vitoria, F,. “Relecciones de la templanza”, in Urdanoz, 
T. (ed.), Obras completas, Madrid, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 
1960, 995-1069, n.1, 1008.
81 Cfr. Cronin, D.A., Ordinay and extraordinary means of con-
serving life, Philadelphia, The National Catholic Bioethics Center, 
2011, 122.
82 Idem, 139.
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tions have to be given so that a medium can be defi-
ned as ordinary and, therefore, morally obligatory83. In 
the Catholic tradition a series of expressions are used to 
define the characteristics of ordinary and extraordinary 
means which Cronin collects and fixes84, in such a way 
that:
a) An ordinary treatment should have all of the fo-
llowing characteristics: Spes salutis /vitae, that is, hope 
that the result is beneficial to the patient and that it 
should be worth it for its quality and duration. The grea-
ter the inconveniences they bear, the greater will have 
to be the hope. Media communia: the medium has to be 
in common use so that it can be considered mandatory. 
Secundam proportionem status: refers to the economic 
situation. Means that could be mandatory for a person 
with a lot of purchasing power, can be optional for an 
individual with normal resources. Media non difficilia: 
should not be too difficult to obtain or use, although mo-
derate difficulty is admitted as the effort to obtain health 
is compensated. Media facilia: is easy to obtain and use.
Under these characteristics, Cronin proposes the fo-
llowing definition of ordinary means: “Ordinary means 
of conserving life are those means commonly used in 
given circumstances, which this individual in his pres-
ent physical, psychological, and economic condition can 
reasonably employ with definite hope of proportionate 
benefit”85.
b) An extraordinary treatment must meet the fo-
llowing characteristics. Quaedam impossibilitas, following 
the principle according to which ad impossibilia nemo 
tenetur, if for any reason a means is impossible to obtain, 
it is no longer mandatory. Summus labor or media nimis 
dura: the means used involves an effort or difficulty that 
goes beyond what is reasonable. Quidam cruciatus or 
ingens dolor: unbearably strong pain. Sumptus extraor-
dinarius, media pretiosa or media exquisitae: excessive 
expenditure, not reasonable according to the economic 
situation itself. Vehemens horror: unconscious fear or re-
83 Cfr. Wildes, K.W., “Ordinary and extraordinary means and 
the quality of life”, Theological Studies, 57 (1996) 500-512, 506.
84 Cfr. Cronin, D.A., Ordinay and extraordinary means…, op. 
cit., 112-139.
85 Idem, 160.
pugnance that constitutes a moral impossibility.
Once the characteristics are established, Cronin pro-
poses the following definition of extraordinary means: 
“Extraordinary means of conserving life are those means 
not commonly used in given circumstances, or those 
means in common use which this individual in his pres-
ent physical, psychological, and economic condition can-
not reasonably employ or, if he can, will not give him 
definite hope of proportionate benefit”86.
According to tradition, the distinction between ordi-
nary and extraordinary means does not refer first to the 
type of medium in general, but to the moral character 
that the use of this medium has for a particular person. 
The distinction focuses on the person of the patient and 
the obligation he has to care for and protect his own 
life87. It is what is called the relative norm. The relative 
norm allows one to be excused from the fulfillment of 
certain positive duties linked to the conservation of life, 
but it does not allow one to be exempted from the 
negative duties of the conservation of life88. It is within 
the scope of positive duties that the relative norm can 
be adopted to define the ordinary (obligatory) or ex-
traordinary (non-mandatory) nature of a life-preserving 
medium89. The teaching of the moral theologians of the 
16th Century has been transmitted without great varia-
tions to the magisterium of the Catholic Church throug-
hout the 20th Century in diverse magisterial documents 
(Table 3).
We summarize below some of the characteristics of 
the doctrine on ordinary and extraordinary means by 
the Magisterium:
- It is a doctrine consolidated from the discourse of 
Pius XII in 1957.
- There is no uniformity in the use of the terms or in 
the meaning given to the terms used, sometimes being 
almost equivalent, while in other cases, when they are 
86 Idem, 112-113.
87 Cfr. Taboada, P., “El principio de proporcionalidad terapéu-
tica…”, op. cit., 124
88 Cfr. Calipari, M., “The principle of proportionality in thera-
py: foundations and applications criteria”, NeuroRehabilitation, 19 
(2004) 391-397, 393.
89 Cfr. Kelly, G., “The duty to preserve life”, Theological Stud-
ies, 12 (1951) 550-556, 555.
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Table 3. Documents of the Catholic Church Magisterium.
Year Documents Fundamental content Input
1957 Pío XII, En réponse 
à trois questions de 
morale médicale sur la 
reanimation
(24.11.1957)
It picks up the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary 
means. Ordinary means compel to the patient, the family and 
the doctor. Extraordinary means do not bind the patient, the 
family, or the doctor. Extraordinary means can be used but are 
not morally obligatory.
First appearance in the 
magisterium of distinction 
between ordinary and 
extraordinary means.
1980 Congregation for the 
Doctrine of Faith
Declaration on 
euthanasia – Iura et 
bona (05.05.1980)
It tries to overcome ordinary / extraordinary distinction by 
introducing the principle of therapeutic proportionality. It 
gives a series of criteria:
- illicit use of disproportionate means
- is licit to discontinuation of disproportionate treatment
- is licit be content with ordinary means
- regardless of the means used, it is lawful in conscience to 
make the decision to renounce treatments that would seek a 
precarious and painful prolongation of life.
Definition of euthanasia
It introduces the concept of 
therapeutic proportionality.
It places the ordinary / 
extraordinary reflection in 
the context of the reflection 
on the end of life.
1981 Pontifical Council Cor 
Unum, Question of 
ethics regarding the 
fatally ill and the dying
(27.06.1981)
Chapter 2.4 It collects the nomenclature of proportionality but 
uses in the text the ordinary / extraordinary distinction.
It introduces the distinction between objective and subjective 
criteria. The fundamental criterion will be to establish a ratio 
between the means and the ends pursued. It defines the 
obligatory minimum means as “those which are normally and 
customarily used for the maintenance of life”.
Chapter 7.2 - 7.3 Doctor’s position. Avoid the therapeutic ob-
stinacy. Evaluate the particular situations of the light of the 
principle of distributive justice. 
It introduces the criterion of 
“quality of life to be saved or 
kept living by the therapy” 
as a criterion of proportional-
ity to which to give a special 
relief.
It includes “what effect will 
be had upon the family” as 
an element of the possible 
decision.
1992 Cathechism of the 
Catholic Church
n. 2278 y 2279
n.2278 Discontinuing medical procedures that are burdensome, 
dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportionate to the expected 
outcome can be legitimate; it is the refusal of “over-zealous” 
treatment.
n. 2279 Encourages palliative care.
Encourages palliative care.
1995 The Pontifical Council 
for Pastoral Assistance 
to Health Care Workers
Charter for Health Care 
Workers
n.119 The problem of dying with dignity and therapeutic ob-
stinacy.
n. 120 The proportionality of the treatments. It also insists on 
nutrition and hydration as normal treatments.
n.121 The role of the doctor is not to decide on life or death, but 
the care of living and dying of the patient. 
The ordinary / extraordinary 
distinction must be applied 
not only in the fine-vitae con-
text but also in any situation 
in which the moral obliga-
tion to use medical therapy is 
called into question.
1995 John Paul II, Encyclical 
letter Evangelium Vitae 
(25.03.1995)
n. 65 Definition of euthanasia. It places euthanasia at both the 
level of intentions and the methods used.
n. 65 Definition of aggressive medical treatment. Medical 
interventions not adequate to the actual situation of the 
patient, because they are disproportionate or because they are 
too burdensome for the patient or his family.
n. 65 The methods of palliative care, as a condition to assure the 
patient adequate human accompaniment.
Definition of aggressive 
medical treatment
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used, they have different nuances.
- The terms ordinary / extraordinary are the most 
used-
- The terms proportionate / disproportionate have 
not been fully assumed in the subsequent documents to 
Iura et bona. The principle of proportionality has been 
used as a criterion for distinguishing between ordinary 
treatments and extraordinary treatments.
Applying the principle of proportionality, both objec-
tive factors (quantitative) and subjective factors (qualita-
tive) are considered, not only in relation to the patient, 
but also to the family.
4.2.2. The principle of ethical adequacy
From the analysis of classical theology and the as-
sumption of the Magisterium about the concepts of 
ordinary and extraordinary treatment, M. Calipari has 
emphasized the difficulty that supposes the existence of 
several ordinary / extraordinary and proportionate / dis-
proportionate terms, and the necessity to consider objec-
tive and subjective aspects when evaluating treatments 
that should be mandatory or optional. Therefore, he 
proposes a decision making process in two phases90:
a) Firstly, an objective phase, based on the evaluation 
of the medical efficacy of the treatment. This stage is ca-
lled the evaluation of the proportionality of the medium 
and tries to evaluate “the technical-medical adequacy 
or inadequacy of its use, in relation to the achievement 
of a specific health objective or vital maintenance for 
the patient”91. At this stage, the most objective aspects 
of treatment should be taken into account, such as its 
reasonable availability, the technical possibility of using 
it properly, a reasonable expectation of medical efficacy, 
possible harmful side effects for the patient, possible 
risks to health and life of the patient, the possibility of 
appealing to other therapies, and the quantification of 
health resources.
b) A second phase, subjective stage, is based on the 
90 Cfr. Calipari, M., Curarsi e farsi curare: tra abbandono del 
paziente e accanimento terapeutico, Torino, San Paolo, 2006, 147-
168.
91 Idem, 152.
evaluation of the global effectiveness of the treatment. 
It is about evaluating the most significant health effects 
that therapy produces for the life of the patient, ac-
cording to the personal assessment of the patient, in 
the context of his/her personal history and according 
to a scale of values. Calipari puts this second phase 
in relation to the concept of ordinary / extraordinary 
treatment considering that this phase is the one that 
better reflects the subjective dimension of the patient, 
who is responsible for evaluating this phase. Based on 
the physical or moral quaedam impossibilitas that Cro-
nin proposed, Calipari considers that it would have to be 
evaluated, in this second phase, if excessive effort is de-
manded for the patient, or an enormous or unbearable 
pain is provoked which cannot be sufficiently relieved; 
if the economic costs are very burdensome for both the 
patient and his / her relatives, or if there is an invincible 
fear or a strong disgust with regard to the treatment: to 
evaluate the reasonably high probability of a serious risk 
to the life or to the health of the patient, evaluated by 
the patient itself in relation to his or her current condi-
tion; the low overall efficiency of treatment in relation 
to the expected benefits and the possible permanence, 
due to the use of the medium, of clinical conditions 
such as to prevent the patient from fulfilling their more 
serious and pressing moral duties, which cannot be de-
ferred without negative consequences for the patient or 
for other people.
Calipari considers that these two phases are not in-
dependent nor successive but they are crossed and over-
lap. He then carries out a synthesis process, obtaining 
three possible results that Calipari values morally:
- a proportionate and ordinary means is compulsory.
- a proportionate and extraordinary means is not 
obligatory (only if it is necessary for the spiritual good 
of the patient or in situations of special obligation of 
justice would it be obligatory)
- a disproportionate means is morally illicit (treatment 
could only be considered if it was the only way for the 
patient to perform serious and pressing moral duties).
The main criticism that can be made to Calipari, and 
which the author himself acknowledges, is that this ap-
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proach, although it includes the elements indicated in 
the magisterial documents, cannot be considered as a 
conclusion that is contained in them. What it does is 
to propose a uniform use of terminology (proportional 
/ disproportional = objective level, ordinary/extraordi-
nary = subjective level) and a procedure, when assessing 
treatments in the later stages of life, which is presented 
as very practical to analyze the most complex cases.
5. The best interests standard as the therapeutic 
proportionality standard
Following Sullivan, we believe that the proposal pre-
sented by Calipari on ordinary and extraordinary means 
could be developed through the distinction between: 
judgments that refer to futility and judgments that re-
fer to proportionality, or to the ordinary / extraordinary 
treatments92. The best interests standard would be safe-
guarded whenever a two-step decision process would 
be followed: the first step, using a negative criterion, in 
which the protagonist is the physician, and the second 
step, using a positive criterion, in which the protagonists 
are the physician, the incompetent patient and their re-
latives or guardians. At the end of these two steps a 
moment of synthesis would come in which the moral 
assessment of the treatment would be carried out. The 
whole of this process is what we call the principle of 
therapeutic proportionality, and we propose it as the 
new content for the standard of the best interests of 
the patient.
5.1. Physiological futility as a negative criterion
We believe that making a judgment on the physio-
logical futility of treatments, understood in this rigo-
rous sense, is based on facts and values that fall within 
the normal competencies of physician and other health 
agents and that, therefore, it would be ethically justi-
fied to not propose these measures to patients and, in 
92 Cfr. Sullivan, S.M., “The development and nature of the 
ordinary/extraordinary means distinction in the Roman Catholic tra-
dition”, Bioethics, 21 (2007) 386-397; You can also see, Requena, 
P., “Il principio di prudenza terapeutica. Oltre le distinzioni ordi-
niario-strarordinario e proporzionato-sproporzionato”, Medicina e 
morale, (2019) 125-139, where he arrives at the same conclusion but 
with a different analasys. 
the case of incompetent patients, to their relatives or 
guardians.
This first step focuses on the technical-medical effica-
cy of treatment and would correspond to the first step 
in the principle of ethical adequacy of Calipari93. Howe-
ver, we believe that the concept of futility reflects more 
clearly this first step, which corresponds to a negative 
criterion (the identification of treatments that should 
not be applied), whose agent is always the medical team 
and which amounts to a morally illicit treatment. This is 
what Calipari would call “disproportionate”. In this sen-
se we prefer the distinction between futile treatment 
and proportionate treatment (which in turn is distin-
guished in ordinary and extraordinary treatment). The 
criterion of physiological futility thus becomes the first 
step of the decisional process, as a negative criterion, 
and is the “useful bridge”94, to arrive at the ethical for-
mulation of ordinary and extraordinary treatments, in 
the specific cases about the end of life.
5.2. The principle of proportionality as a positive 
criterion
When we talk about making proportionality judg-
ments, we have to keep in mind that it is a separate ca-
tegory of other judgments. These judgments would be 
necessary when medical information on the efficacy of 
possible treatments, in relation to the global target of 
the chosen treatment, is uncertain, probable or incom-
plete. That is, proportionality has to do with uncertainty 
about the effects of treatment and uncertainty about 
the prognosis of the disease. In this second moment the 
subjective aspects are taken into account.
Contrary to the judgments about futile treatments, 
judgments regarding the proportionality of treatments, 
in relation to the overall objective, should be discussed 
with the patient and, for incompetent patients, with 
their relatives or guardians95. They are the ones who 
93 Cfr. Calipari, M., Curarsi e farsi curare…, op. cit., 152.
94 Cfr. Pellegrino, E.D., “Decision at the end of life…”, op. cit. 
220.
95 Cfr. Sullivan, W., “Diferenza tra limitazione dell’impegno 
terapeutico ed eutanasia omissiva: il ruolo dell’indicazione medica”, 
in Sgreccia, E., Laffitte, J., (eds.), Accanto al malato inguaribile e 
al morente: orientamenti etici ed operativi. Atti della quattordi-
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have to evaluate, together with the doctors, if at this 
moment and in this specific situation, they have a cer-
tain impossibility (quaedam impossibilitas), physical or 
moral, for the use of this particular treatment. The fol-
lowing must be evaluated:
- If the effort is excessive when disposing or using 
the treatment not only by the patient but by the family.
- Whether the physical pain will be heavy or unbea-
rable or cannot be sufficiently relieved.
- If the economic costs to use the treatment are bur-
densome for the family of the patient.
- If the patient or his / her relatives, caregivers, expe-
rience a tremendous fear or a strong repugnance regar-
ding the use of the means.
- A reasonably high probability of serious risk to the 
life or health of the patient that is linked to the use of 
the medium that is valued by the family in relation to 
the severity of the patient’s current situation.
- A low “global efficacy” rate, in relation to the bene-
fits reasonably expected for the patient, according to the 
cesima assemblea generale della Pontifica Accademia per la Vita, 
Ciudad del Vaticano, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009, 173-195; Gon-
zález-Melado, F.J., “Family Centered Bioethics: a new bioethical 
framework for decision-making in neonatal and pediatric units”, 
Journal of Clinical Research and Bioethics, 7 (2016) 1-5.
axiological and values scale adopted by their relatives.
- The permanence, after the use of the treatment, of 
clinical conditions that prevent the patient from fulfi-
lling the most serious and pressing duties.
5.3. Two moments that overlap
We believe that these two moments are not suc-
cessive phases but they overlap in the dialogue of the 
medical team and the relatives when deciding which 
treatments can be applied to incompetent patients. 
The meaning of the therapeutic proportionality stan-
dard is not tied to the state of technological progress 
nor to the naturalness or artificiality of the treatment, 
but taking into account the specific situation of the 
patient and his / her family, examines the efficacy (ob-
jective / futility) and the global efficacy (subjective / 
the principle of proportionality) having as protagonists 
and moral agents in the decision both physicians and 
relatives. This is the only way to safeguard the patient’s 
best interest standard.
5.4. The ethical assessment of treatment
The evaluation of treatment would be defined ac-
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cording to the results obtained in the two steps of our 
decision process (Figure 2):
- If the doctor considers that a particular treatment 
is futile, given the patient’s clinical situation, it is ethi-
cally justified not to offer this treatment to his relatives, 
although it would be advisable to explain to his parents 
the reasons that lead him to consider it futile. Following 
Wilkinson’s scheme, physiological futility would be the 
“lower threshold” below which doctors would not be 
allowed to offer treatment to the patient’s family mem-
bers (Figure 3).
- If the doctor considers that the treatment is not fu-
tile, given the patient’s clinical situation, he/she should 
offer it to the parents, initiating a dialogue in which, 
together with the family members, he/she must evaluate 
whether the treatment is ordinary or extraordinary. If 
the assessment they make is that the treatment is ordi-
nary, it means that the treatment is mandatory and can-
not be withdrawn. It would equate to what Wilkinson 
considers “upper threshold”, above which treatment is 
mandatory and physicians cannot allow family mem-
bers to stop treatment (Figure 3). If the assessment they 
make is that the treatment is extraordinary, it means 
that the treatment is not mandatory, it is optional, and 
that if you choose to start treatment it can be suspen-
ded at a certain time. This is what Wilkinson called the 
“grey zone”.
In developing the two steps of the patient’s best 
interest standard, understood as the therapeutic propor-
tionality standard, we obtain the following classification 
of treatments destined to the conservation of life:
A) futile (disproportionate)
B) non-futile and ordinary treatment (proportionate 
& ordinary)
C) non-futile and extraordinary treatment (propor-
tionate & extraordinary)
In critical clinical situations, where the patient’s best 
interest standard is required, physicians and their fami-
lies can make a moral assessment of treatments by assig-
ning them to one of these three categories. The moral 
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criteria of treatment efficacy (physiological futility as a "lower threshold"), and the assessment of 
treatment by the medical team with the patient’s family (ordinary treatment = "upper threshold", 
extraordinary treatment = "gray zone"). The process, as a whole, is the therapeutic proportionality 
standard as the new content for the patient's best interest standard. 
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value of each category is defined by the moral duty of 
the use of this means to preserve the life of the patient 
and which is defined, in turn, by three moral categories: 
illicit, compulsory and optional.
The possible treatments would be morally valued as 
follows:
A) A futile treatment would be morally illicit, could 
be considered excessive and would amount to a thera-
peutic obstinacy.
B) A non-futile and ordinary treatment would be 
morally compulsory and cannot be suspended without 
committing euthanasia.
C) A non-futile and extraordinary treatment would 
be morally optional or facultative, and the patient, or 
his/her relatives in the case of an incompetent patient, 
can decide whether to use it or not.
6. Conclusion. Answering three questions
In redefining the patient’s best interest standard, we 
asked ourselves three questions that we have attempted 
to answer by redefining the content of the best interests 
as the therapeutic proportionality standard.
The answer to the first question, when to apply the 
standard of the best interests?, is given by the clinical sit-
uation of the patient. In cases where treatment is clearly 
indicated and effective, although the process of ethical 
deliberation would not be strictly necessary, it is conve-
nient to carry out a deliberative communication process 
prior to the decision-making process, where doctors can 
propose to the relatives of the incompetent patient the 
elected treatment. The application of the best interests 
standard would be reserved for those critical situations, 
where proportionality judgments come into play, that is, 
where there is an uncertainty both in the effectiveness 
of the treatment and in the prognosis, or when it is the 
same, in the global objective of treatment.
The second question refers to the application pro-
cedure: “How should it be applied?” We propose an 
application of the standard in two phases, not successive 
but overlapping, and which correspond to a dialogical 
process between physician and family. In a first step, 
and as a negative criterion, would be the analysis by 
the medical team of the physiological futility of possi-
ble treatments. It is a technical-medical decision that 
includes the objective level of the moral qualification 
of treatment. At another given time, it would try to 
establish the best interests of the patient through the 
content that gives us the principle of proportionality. It 
is a moment of evaluating the subjective aspects, which 
refer to the patient and his / her relatives when facing 
the disease and the proposed treatments.
The sum of these two elements (futility + principle of 
proportionality) is what we consider to be the content 
of the standard of best interest of the patient and which 
we call the standard of therapeutic proportionality.
The third question referred to the moral agent, 
the protagonist in the decision making process: “Who 
should decide?” In the first step, the technical-medical 
analysis of the futility of the treatments, pertains to the 
medical team. It is very important that in this part of 
the process, the medical team’s decision is marked by 
scientific-medical data and is not influenced by subjec-
tive assessments, such as the patient’s future QL, which 
could condition the approach to a particular treatment. 
In the second step, the decision belongs to the medical 
team and family members. Through a process of de-
cision-making in dialogue, it is the medical team who 
must present to the relatives the different possibilities 
of treatment, showing the difficulties, risks and compli-
cations of each treatment. The relatives are those who, 
based on the offer of possible treatments, must make 
an analysis of the proportionality (ordinary / extraordi-
nary) of the treatments, taking into account the specific 
circumstances of both the patient and his/her family. The 
decisions are taken by the medical team and the family 
members. They are the moral agents responsible for the 
decision making process in this second phase.
References
American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics, 
“Treatment of critically ill newborns”, Pediatrics, 72 
(1983) 565-566.
American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Fetus 
and Newbor, “The initiation or withdrawasl otr 
Fermín Jesús González-melado, maría luisa di Pietro The TherapeuTic proporTionaliTy sTandard: a new conTenT for The besT inTeresTs sTandard
Cuadernos de BioétiCa. 2020; 31(101): 19-42 
39
treatment for high-risk newborns”, Pediatrics 96 
(1995) 362-363.
Baines, P., “Family interest and medical decisions for chil-
dren”, Bioethics, 31 (2017) 599-607.
Basilius Magnus, Regulae Furius Tractae, 398 ed. J.P. Mig-
ne, Pratologiae Graecae XXXI.
Beauchamp, T.L., Childress, J.F., Principles of biomedical 
ethics, New York, Oxford University Press, 20086.
Bester, J.C., “The harm principle cannot replace the best 
interest standard: problems with using the harm 
principle for medical decision making for children”, 
The American Journal of Bioethics, 18 (2018) 9-19.
Bester, J.C., “The best interest standard is the best we 
have: why the harm principle and constrained pa-
rental autonomy cannot replace the best interest 
standard in pediatric ethics”, The Journal of Clinical 
Ethics, 30 (2019) 223-231
Birchley, G. “Harm is all you need? Best interests and 
disputes about parental decision-making”, Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 42 (2016) 111-115.
Brody, B.A., Halevy, A., “Is futility a futile concept?”, 
The Journal of Medicine and Philososphy, 20 (1995) 
123-144.
Brody, H., “In the best interests of”, The Hastings Center 
Report, 18 (1988) 37-39.
Buchanan, A.E., Brock, D.W., Deciding for others: The 
ethics of surrogate decision-making. New York, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1989.
Burns, J.P., Truog, R.D., “Futility: a concept in evolution”, 
Chest, 132 (2007) 1987-1993.
Calipari, M., “The principle of proportionality in thera-
py: foundations and applications criteria”, NeuroRe-
habilitation 19 (2004) 391-397
Calipari, M., Curarsi e farsi curare: tra abbandono del 
paziente e accanimento terapeutico, Torino, San Pa-
olo, 2006.
Callahan, D., “Medical futility, medical necessity. The-
problem-without-a-name”, The Hastings Center Re-
port, 21 (1991) 30-35.
Committee on the Rights of the Children, General Com-
ment No 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have 
his or her best interests taken as a primary consider-
ation (art. 3, para. 1)*
Coulson-Smith P., Fenwick, A., Lucassen, A., “In defense of 
best interests: When parents and clinicians disagree”, 
The American Journal of Bioethics, 18 (2018) 67-69.
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs - American Me-
dical Association, “Guidelines for the appropriate 
use of do-not-resuscitate orders”, JAMA 265 (1991) 
1868-1871.
Cronin, D.A., Ordinay and extraordinary means of con-
serving life, Philadelphia, The National Catholic 
Bioethics Center, 2011.
Davies, J.K., “The concept of precedent autonomy”, Bio-
ethics, 16 (2002)114-133.
De Vitoria, F., “Relecciones de la templanza”,in Urdanoz, 
T. (ed.), Obras completas, Madrid, Biblioteca de Au-
tores Cristianos, 1960, 995-1069.
De Vos, M.A., Seeber, A.A., Gevers, S.K. et al. “Parents 
who wish no futher treatment for their child”, Jour-
nal of Medical Ethics, 41 (2015) 195-200;
Diekema, D.S, “Decision making on behalf of children 
understanding the role of the harm principle”, The 
Journal of Clinical Ethics, 30 (2019) 2017-212.
Diekema, D.S. “Parental Refusals of mediacla treatment: 
the harm principle as a threshold for state interven-
tion”, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 25 (2004) 
243-264.
Downie, R.S., Randall, F., 2Parenting and the best inter-
ests of minors”, The Journal of Medicine and Philoso-
phy, 22 (1997) 219-231.
Ellinston, S, The best interests of the child in helthcare. 
London: Routledge Cavendish, 2007.
Engelhardt, H.T. Jr., “Medicine and the concept of per-
son”, in Beauchamp, T.L., Perlin, S., (eds.), Ethical is-
sues in death and dying, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-
Hall, 1978.
European Court of Human Rights, Charles Gard and 
Others against the United Kingdom. Application no. 
39793. 3 July 2017
Gillam, L., “The zone of parental discretion: an ethical 
tool for dealing with disagreement between parents 
Fermín Jesús González-melado, maría luisa di Pietro The TherapeuTic proporTionaliTy sTandard: a new conTenT for The besT inTeresTs sTandard
Cuadernos de BioétiCa. 2020; 31(101): 19-42 
40
and doctors about medical treatment for a child”, 
Clinical Ethics, 11 (2016) 1-8.
Goldstein, J., Solnit, A.J., Goldstein, S., Freud, A., The 
best interests of the child. The least detrimental al-
ternative, New York, The Free Press, 1996.
Gonzalez-Melado FJ, “Wilkinson D. Death or Disability? 
The “Carmentis Machine” and decision-making for 
critically ill children. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2013”, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 36 (2015) 
363-368.
González-Melado, F.J. “Family Centered Bioethics: a new 
bioethical framework for decision-making in neona-
tal and pediatric units”, Journal of Clinical Research 
and Bioethics, 7 (2016) 1-5.
González-Melado, F.J., Di Pietro, M.L., “El estándar del 
mejor interés del niño en neonatología: ¿es lo me-
jor para el niño?”, Cuadernos de Bioética, 26 (2015) 
201-222.
Harper, W., “Judging who should live: Schneiderman 
an Jecker on the duty not to treat”, The Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy, 23 (1998) 500-515.
Helft, P.R., Siegler, M., Lantos, J., “The rise and fall of 
the futility movement”, The New England Journal of 
Medicine, 343 (2000) 293-296.
Hester, D.M., “Offering the ‘reasonable intersts stan-
dard’ in response to Ross’s analysis of the best in-
terests standard”, The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 30 
(2019) 196-200;
High Court of Justice Family División, “Great Ormond 
Street Hospital and Constance Yates, Christopher 
Gard, and Charlie Gard, (2017) EWHC 972 (Fam.). No. 
FD17P00103. 11 April 2017, section 53.
Hook, C.C., “Medical Futility”, in Kilner, J. et al., (eds.), 
Dignity and dying: a christian appraisal, Michigan, 
Paternoster Press, 1996, 84-95.
Howe, E.G., “Treating children maximally: practical 
applications”, The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 30 (2019) 
171-182.
Hubbard, R, Greenblum, J., “Parental decision making: 
the best intests principle, child autonomy, and rea-
sonableness”, HEC Forum, acces online [https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10730-019-09373-9]
Iceta, M., Futilidad y toma de decisiones en medicina 
paliativa, Córdoba, Caja Sur, 1997.
Jecker, N.S., “Medical futility: a paradigm analysis”, HEC 
forum: an Interdisciplinary Journal on Hospitals’ Ethi-
cal and Legal Issues, 19 (2007)13-32.
Jonsen, A.R., A short history of medical ethics, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2000.
Kelly, G., “The duty to preserve life”, Theological Stud-
ies,12 (1951) 550-556.
Kohm, L.M., “Tracing the foundations of the best inter-
ests of the child standard in american jurispruden-
ce”, Journal of Law and Family Studies, 10 (2008) 
337-376.
Koop, C.E., “The Challenge of Definition”, The Hastings 
Center Report, 19 (1989) 2-3.
Kopelman, L.M., “Children: health care and research Is-
sues”, in Post, S.G., (ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 
New York, Macmillan, 19953, 387-399.
Kopelman, L.M., “Rejecting the Baby Doe rules and de-
fending a ‘negative’ analysis of the Best Interests 
Standard”, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 
30 (2005) 331-352.
Kopelman, L.M., “The best interests standard as thres-
hold, ideal, an standard of reasonableness”, The 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 22 (1997) 281-
289.
Kopelman, L.M, “Why the best interest standard is not 
self-defeating, too individualistic, unknowable, va-
gue or subjective”, The American Journal of Bioeth-
ics, 18 (2018) 34-36.
Malek, J. “What really is in a child’ s best interest? Toward 
a more precise picture of the interests of children”, 
The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 20 (2009) 175-182.
Martin, W., Freyenhagen, F., Hall, E., O’Shea, T., Szer-
letics, A., Ashley, V., “An unblinkered view of best 
interests”, British Medical Journal, 345 (2012) e8007.
Miller, R.B., Children, ethics and modern medicine, Bloo-
mington, Indiana University Press. 2003.
Millum, J., The moral foundations of parenthood, New 
York, Oxford University Press 2018.
Millum, J., “The ‘reasonable subject standard’ as an al-
Fermín Jesús González-melado, maría luisa di Pietro The TherapeuTic proporTionaliTy sTandard: a new conTenT for The besT inTeresTs sTandard
Cuadernos de BioétiCa. 2020; 31(101): 19-42 
41
ternative to the ‘best interest standard’”, The Ameri-
can Journal of Bioethics, 18 (2018) 66-67.
Moos, K., “The ‘Baby Doe’ legislation: it rise and fall”, 
Policy Studies Journal, 15 (1987) 629-651.
Murphy, D.J., Finucane, T.E., “New do-not-resuscitate po-
licies. A first step in cost control”, Archives of Internal 
Medicine,153 (1993) 1641-1648.
Nelson, S.N., “Do everything! Encountering ‘futility’ in 
medical practice”, Ethics & Medicine, 19 (2003) 103-
113.
Paquette, E.T., Ross, L.F., “Pediatric decision making re-
quires both guidance and intervention principles”, 
The American Journal of Bioethics, 18 (2018) 44-46.
Pellegrino, E.D., “Decision at the end of life: the use 
and abuse of the concept of futility”, in Vial-Correa, 
J.D., Sgreccia, E. (eds.), The dignity of the dying per-
son. Proccedings of the fifth assembly of the Pontifi-
cal Academy for life, Ciudad del Vaticano, Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana, 2000, 219-241.
Pellegrino, E.D., “Patient autonomy and the physician’s 
ethics”, Annals Royal College of Physicians and Sur-
geons of Canada, 27 (1994) 171-173.
Placencia, F.X., McCullough, L.B., “The history of ethical 
decision making in neonatal intensive care”, Journal 
of Intensive Care Medicine, 26 (2011) 368-384.
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
Deciding to forego life-sustaining treatment: a re-
port on the ethical, medical, and legal issues in treat-
ment decisions. March 1983., Washington DC, U.S. 
Goberment Printing Office, 1983.
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Behavioral Research, Making health 
care decisions, Washington DC, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1982.
Requena, P., “Il principio di prudenza terapeutica. Ol-
tre le distinzioni ordiniario-strarordinario e propor-
zionato-sproporzionato”, Medicina e morale, (2019) 
125-139
Rhodes, R., Holzman, I.R., “Is the best interest standard 
good for Pediatrics?”, Pediatrics, 134 (2014) S121-S129.
Ross, L.F., “Better than best (interest standard) in pedia-
tric decision making”, The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 
30 (2019) 183-195.
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, Declara-
tion on Euthanasia Iura et bona (05.05.1980).
Salter, E.K., “Deciding for a child: a comprehensive 
analysis of the best interest standard”, Theoretical 
Medicine and Bioethics, 33 (2012) 179-198.
Salter, E.K., “When better isn’t good enough: commen-
tary on Ross’s ‘Better than best (interest standard) in 
pediatric decision making”, The Journal of Clinical 
Ethics, 30 (2019) 213-217.
Schneiderman, L.J., Jecker, N.S., “CPR-not-indicated and 
futility”, Annals of Internal Medicine, 124 (1996) 
75-77.
Schneiderman, L.J., Jecker, N.S., Jonsen, A.R., “Medical 
futility: its meaning and ethical implications”, Annals 
of Internal Medicine, 112 (1990) 949-954.
Segura Munguía S., Diccionario Etimológico Latino-Espa-
ñol, Madrid, Ediciones Generales Anaya, 1985.
Shad, S.K., Rosemberg, A.R., Diekema, D.S., “Charlie 
Gard and the limits of Best Interests”, JAMA Pedia-
trics, 171 (2017) 937-938.
Sullivan, S.M., “The development and nature of the or-
dinary/extraordinary means distinction in the Roman 
Catholic tradition”, Bioethics, 21 (2007) 386-397.
Sullivan, W., “Diferenza tra limitazione dell’impegno 
terapeutico ed eutanasia omissiva: il ruolo dell’indi-
cazione medica”, in Sgreccia, E., Laffitte, J., (eds.), 
Accanto al malato inguaribile e al morente: orienta-
menti etici ed operativi. Atti della quattordicesima 
assemblea generale della Pontifica Accademia per la 
Vita, Ciudad del Vaticano, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 
2009, 173-195.
Taboada, P., “El principio de proporcionalidad terapéuti-
ca en las decisiones de limitar tratamientos”, Boletín 
Escuela de Medicina, 27 (1998)17-23.
The Hastings Center, Guidelines on the termination of 
life-sustaining treatment and the care of the dying, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1987.
Fermín Jesús González-melado, maría luisa di Pietro The TherapeuTic proporTionaliTy sTandard: a new conTenT for The besT inTeresTs sTandard
Cuadernos de BioétiCa. 2020; 31(101): 19-42 
42
Truog, R.D., Brett, A.S., Frader, J., “The problem with 
futility”, The New England Journal of Medicine, 326 
(1992) 1560-1564.Veatch,R.M., “Abandoning informed 
consent”, The Hastings Center Report, 25 (1995) 5-12.
Wildes, K.W., “Ordinary and extraordinary means and 
the quality of life”, Theological Studies 57 (1996) 
500-512.
Wilkinson, D., Death or Disability? The “Carmentis Ma-
chine” and decision-making for critically ill children, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.
Winters, J.P., “When parents refuse: resolving entren-
ched disagreements between parents and clinicians 
in situations of uncertainty and complexity”, The 
American Journal of Bioethics 18, (2018) 20-31.
